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ABSTRACT 
 
Employing the content analysis approach, this paper aims to identify the determinants of corporate 
social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) in China using the annual reports of over 800 A-share listed 
firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. We find that CSRD is positively associated with firm size, 
media exposure, share ownership concentration and institutional shareholding. Moreover, firms in 
High-Profile environmentally sensitive industries tend to disclose more corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) information than those in Low-Profile environmentally sensitive industries, 
supporting the view that political cost is the primary constraint for Chinese listed firms. Our results 
provide important insights for academics interested in the CSR issue in emerging economies, for 
enterprise managers interested in exploiting the annual reports as a strategy to legitimize their 
corporate social conduct, and for government regulators committed to improving CSR activities and 
information disclosure. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
s the world economy becomes more integrated, firms face increasing pressure to disclose their 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) information over the last few decades (Hooghiemstra, 2000). It is 
reported that more than half of the Fortune 1,000 firms regularly issue CSR reports (Jo and Kim, 2008). 
Consequently, corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) has attracted considerable research interests since the 
1980s (Ullmann, 1985; Ness and Mirza, 1991; Gray, Kouhy and Lavers, 1995; Blacconiere and Northcut, 1997; 
Bewley and Li, 2000; Toms, 2002; Patten, 1991, 1992, 2002). 
 
Existing studies suggest that CSRD may bring reporting firms at least two advantages. First, it may enhance 
corporate reputation through gaining trust and support from various stakeholders (Woodward, Edwards and Birkin, 
1996). Second, it is helpful to assess the congruence between the social value implied by corporate activities and social 
norms (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). Information disclosure is closely associated with the social and economic 
environment, and thus, different social-economic institutions may influence the pattern and level of CSRD. 
 
After more than three decades of fast economic growth, China overtook Japan and became the world’s 
second largest economy in 2010.
1
 However, rapid economic expansion has caused a number of social and 
environmental problems, including environmental degradation, resource depletion, product quality and safety, social 
injustice, persistence of poverty and lack of labour protection. 
 
In China, there have been a rising number of firms causing significant damage to the society. For example, in 
2008 the San Lu Corporation was found to have produced ‘tainted milk powder’ which is detrimental to health, or even 
leading to death of babies. Another example is Foxconn that 13 young workers committed suicides in the first six 
months of 2010 in this large company making iPods and iPhones for Apple Co. 
 
                                                        
1 See, Japanese Economy Slips to Third in the World, http://news.sky.com, 16-08-2010. 
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These high-profile events evoked serious criticisms throughout China, highlighting the lack of CSR in many 
Chinese firms. In order to distinguish themselves from these high-profile events and build up good corporate image, an 
increasing number of Chinese firms start to engage in CSR activities and information disclosure. More importantly, 
there was a substantial change in 2008 regarding CSR disclosure which may have influenced Chinese listed firms’ 
behaviour and their disclosure practice. CSR information disclosure was voluntary for all companies until the end of 
2008 and became mandatory for some listed firms from 2009. In 2008, the Chinese Stock Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) made the CSR report an formal requirement for three types of listed firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SSE) (i.e., firms from the finance industry, firms listed on foreign stock exchanges
2
, and firms in the SSE corporate 
governance composite index group
3
), and firms in the Shenzhen 100 composite stock index to disclose along with 
their annual reports. As CSRC does not provide detailed guidelines for firms, firms can exert some discretion on 
information to be reported. 
 
This paper extends existing work in three dimensions. First, existing literature mainly focuses on voluntary 
CSRD (Barakas and Brown 2008), particularly in the western developed countries (Patten, 1991, 1992; Ullmann, 1985; 
Toms, 2002). China provides a quasi-natural experimental setting to observe the effect of mandatory regulation on 
CSR disclosure thereby presenting empirical evidence on the firms’ response to the government requirements on CSR 
disclosure. It further enriches literature by investigating the determinants of CSR disclosure in a mandatory context. 
 
Second, this study provides evidence that political cost is a main constraint for Chinese firms to determine 
whether to disclose CSR Reports and what to be disclosed in annual reports. Existing literature investigates these two 
theories independently. By using two industry-specific proxies to represent two theories respectively, i.e., environment 
sensitive industry for political cost theory and consumer proximity industry for legitimacy theory, we investigate the 
effectiveness of these two theories. Results indicate that political cost theory has priority when Chinese firms 
determine whether to be disclosed, though both political cost theory and legitimacy theory could be employed to 
explain the variance of CSR information disclosure between Chinese firms. Our findings provide an important insight 
for academics interested in CSR development in emerging economies. 
 
Finally, this paper provides an insight into understanding the relationship between CSR disclosure and social 
publicity. This paper studies the relationship between CSRD and media attraction, and results indicate that a firm’s 
CSRD is positively related to the media attraction. With the fast development of media technology, an increasing 
number of people are involved in the media agenda and activities (CNNIC, 2013). And hence, our result has 
significant implications for managers, particularly in the small business. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews the theory and empirical 
evidence of CSRD. A number of hypotheses are also presented. The third section describes data and research 
methodologies. The fourth section presents empirical results. The final section concludes with some policy 
recommendations. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Legitimacy Theory and Political Cost Perspective 
 
The relationship between a corporation and its environment and the role that CSRD plays in influencing this 
relationship have become important business issues over the last few decades. A number of studies show that it is 
difficult for firms investing in CSR activities to maximize their reputation without disclosing information of such 
activities (Hasseldine, Salama and Toms, 2005; Toms, 2002). Although it seems a little utilitarian and strategic, it is 
generally accepted that firms engaging in CSR activities usually concern the disclosure of related information because 
of its contribution to financial performance (Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes, 2003; Barnett, 2007) or market value 
                                                        
2 This kind of firms are required to disclose CSR reporting mainly because the international pressure faced by these firms when 
cross-listing on international stock market exchanges such as Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) or New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE). 
3 The corporate governance composite index group was initiated by the Shanghai Stock Exchange to promote better corporate 
governance structure. The first index was issued on the first trading day in 2008. Corporations on the SSE can apply to be included. 
Applications are evaluated for inclusion by a special committee organized by the exchange. Firms on the composite index are 
reviewed each year. Corporation with bad behaviors would be removed from the index group. In general, firms in this group are 
often viewed as ones that have better corporate governance practices. 
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(Mackey, Mackey and Barney, 2007). In fact, CSRD is helpful to assess the congruence between the social value 
implied by CSR activities and the social norms – legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). 
 
According to the legitimacy theory, CSRD is a response to both public pressure and media attention or social 
visibility resulting from major social incidents (Patten, 1991, 1992; Walden and Schwartz, 1997; Brown and Deegan, 
1998). Legitimacy is fundamental for an organization to survive and exist in the society in the long term, which cannot 
come from either the making of profit or the mere observing of legal requirements, but the continuing mandate of 
society at large (Shocker and Sethi, 1974). However, it is almost impossible to maximize firm value and financial 
performance if a firm is not socially responsible and shares with the public their CSR information (Pava and Krausz, 
1996). For example, Sanlu Corporation went bankruptcy for producing ‘tainted milk powder’ in 2008, and Foxxcon 
had to move its factory to another province because of the continuous worker suicide event in 2010. 
 
CSRD is reactive to environmental factors and disclosures legitimize actions (Guthrie and Parker, 1989). 
Deegan, Rankin and Voght (2000) argue that the increase in social disclosures represents a strategy to alter public 
perception about the legitimacy of an organization, and then achieve the continuing mandate of society. CSRD is a 
critical way for firms to communicate with society, to convince the public that they are meeting their social 
expectations (Branco and Rodrigues 2008). Consequently, CSRD can be considered as a signal of building up 
legitimacy thereby improving firms’ social and environmental conducts and social reputation (Neu, Warsame and 
Pedwell, 1998; O’Donovan 2000; Guthrie and Parker 1989). Patten (1992) suggests that social information in annual 
reports can influence public policies, directly by addressing public and/or legislative concerns, or indirectly by 
projecting an image of the company’s social awareness. It is argued that the greater the likelihood of adverse shifts in 
public policy, the greater the need to influence the process through social disclosure. 
 
On the other hand, researchers developed a political cost hypothesis to argue that firms employ social 
responsibility activities to reduce the risk of governmental intrusions, such as regulation, that may adversely affect 
firm value (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Government controls critical resources, with an important power to affect 
wealth transfers between different groups, while the business enterprises are vulnerable to these wealth redistributions. 
And hence, corporations employ a lot of devices, such as corporate social responsibility disclosure, to counter the 
potential government intrusions (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). 
 
In China, CSR information disclosure has been voluntary for all firms for years. The requirement of Chinese 
Stock Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2008 changed CSR information disclosure practice drastically, mandatory 
for some firms and voluntary for others. In the field of CSR research, however, legitimacy theory is rooted in a 
voluntary context, while political cost perspective is associated with government regulation. Based on these two 
aspects, we develop hypotheses to investigate the factors that influence CSR information disclosure quantity in a more 
plural society. 
 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
2.2.1 Industry 
 
Industry classification is a commonly accepted factor to distinguish CSRD among different firms in existing 
studies. However, some industries face more rigorous scrutiny, while others are under more social visibility and public 
pressure. Numerous researchers (e.g., Bowman and Haire, 1975; Cowen, Ferreri and Parker, 1987; Ness and Mirza, 
1991; Gao, 2009) note that the extent to which public pressure firms face regarding social issues varies across 
industries. Firms with more environmental impact are found to disclose more environmental information than others 
due to the higher public pressure (Patten, 1991; Adams, Hill and Roberts, 1998). For example, the extractive and 
chemical industries tend to produce more pollution than other industries. Hence, they are subject to more public 
pressure regarding their environmental impact and product safety (Dierkes and Preston, 1977). More importantly, with 
the improvement of environment protection policies, firms in high-profile environment sensitive industries might face 
much higher political costs for non-compliance with the rules than others. Accordingly, we posit the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1a: Firms in environmentally sensitive industries tend to disclose more CSR information than others, especially 
CSR information related to environment responsibility. 
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In addition, from a consumer visibility perspective, firms producing goods which are widely consumed tend 
to generate more social visibility (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). After the Wenchuan Earthquake on 12 May 2008, for 
example, many firms donated money to the earthquake relief efforts. The JDB Associates, a private Chinese company 
producing soft drinks, became well-known almost overnight due to its 100 million RMB donation
4
. The soft drink 
‘Wang Laoji’, a main product of JDB Co., received rocketing demand and tremendous reaction from customers after 
the donation. The company name was also quickly known all over the country. And hence, we posit the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1b: Firms in consumer proximity industries are more likely to disclose CSR information than others, especially 
CSR information related to consumer responsibility. 
 
2.2.2 Firm Size 
 
A number of studies indicate that large firms are subject to more social and political pressure than small firms. 
Trotman and Bradley (1981) find that company size appears a significant explanatory variable in their studies of social 
responsibility disclosure. Cowen, Ferreri and Parker (1987) argue that “the larger firms tend to receive more attention 
from the general public and, therefore, to be under greater public pressure to exhibit social responsibility.” Larger 
organizations such as BP and Shell under intense public scrutiny due to their controversial activities push and 
proselytize the CSR agenda, and then win CSR disclosure award. Ahmed and Courtis (1999) also suggest that size is 
one of the most important predictors of disclosure level in corporate annual reports. Because larger firms are assumed 
to face greater pressures than smaller firms, the former will increase their disclosures more than the latter to establish 
a good social image as part of their business strategy. 
 
In light of the political cost, larger firms, compared with the smaller firms, usually assume higher political 
costs because large firms suffer more rigorous scrutiny from the regulatory agencies. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) 
argue that larger firms falling into the mandatory requirements are more politically sensitive and visible in the 
stakeholders’ eye than smaller ones. Managers of larger firms may disclose social activities in an independent CSR 
report or annual reports as part of a strategy to enhance or change the perception of stakeholders or manage, or to 
reduce political costs by satisfying the mandatory requirements. Accordingly, we posit the following hypothesis. 
 
H2: Corporate social responsibility disclosure is positively associated with firm size. 
 
2.2.3 Media Exposure 
 
Individual firms’ media exposure, which is generally employed as a proxy for social visibility, is likely to be 
associated with more CSRD (Bansal, 2005; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Reverte, 2009). 
Bansal (2005) suggests that more media coverage raises firms’ visibility, making them the object of further public 
attention and scrutiny and inviting further public attention and scrutiny (Branco and Rodrigues 2008). 
 
In addition, media plays an important role in affecting stakeholders’ decision because it is the main source of 
CSR information (Simon 1992). In China, listed firms are required to issue annual reports in three designated national 
newspapers: China Securities Journal, Securities Times, and Shanghai Securities Gazette. Listed firms can disclose 
annual reports on any or all of these three newspapers. By publishing annual reports in more than one media outlet, 
firms aim to attract more public attention to their CSR activities and legitimize the conduct. Consequently, we posit the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Corporate social responsibility disclosure is positively associated with the media exposure. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGIES 
 
3.1 Data and Sample 
 
The sample used in this study comprises all A-share firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE). 
Firms listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) are not used in this study because regulatory rules governing 
                                                        
4 It was reported that this was the first 100 million RMB philanthropic giving after the Wenchuan Earthquake. 
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both stock exchanges are not comparable. Furthermore, to achieve meaningful and consistent results, firms are 
included in the sample if they meet following criteria: (1) listed on SSE before the end of 2009; (2) annual reports for 
2008 and/or 2009 available; (3) financial data available from China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database 
(CSMAR)
5
. Applying the above-mentioned criteria, 851 and 856 firms are selected in this study for 2008 and 2009 
respectively
6
. CSR information item and media exposure data are manually collected by two Master students. All the 
data related to the financial statements and corporate governance used in this paper are from CSMAR database. 
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  Summary Statistics of the Sample Firms 
Industry Distribution 
2008  
N (%) 
2009 
N (%) 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing & Hunting 21(2.47) 20(2.34) 
Mining  27(3.17) 28(3.27) 
Manufacturing  439(51.59) 438(51.17) 
Electricity, Gas & Water Supply 39(4.58) 42(4.91) 
Construction 23(2.70) 22(2.57) 
Transport & Storage 49(5.76) 48(5.61) 
Information & Technology 50(5.88) 51(5.96) 
Wholesale & Retail Trade 61(7.17) 59(6.89) 
Finance & Insurance 20(2.35) 23(2.69) 
Real Estate 44(5.17) 49(5.72) 
Social Services 22(2.59) 23(2.69) 
Media & Culture 9(1.06) 8(0.93) 
Conglomerate 47(5.52) 45(5.26) 
Notes:  Numbers in brackets are proportion of the total number of firms. 
 
The sample firms are grouped according to the Industry Classification issued by the China Security 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2001
7
. Manufacturing sector provides the largest population of CSR information 
items, accounting for more than half of all sample firms. The Wholesale & Retail Trade industry sector follows. The 
Media and Culture industry provides the fewest of all sectors. On average, firm size, measured by total assets at the 
fiscal year end, increased from 53,311 million RMB in 2008 to 66,430 million RMB in 2009. Amongst the sample 
firms, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited (ICBC) was the largest in both years, with a total asset of 
9,757 billion RMB in 2008 and 11,875 billion RMB in 2009, respectively. 
 
3.2 Measurement 
 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
 
The definition of CSR differs between firms, but in general, CSR covers a multi-dimensional perspective 
relating to the environment, society and business community (Tsoi, 2010). The term ‘‘responsibility’’ also extends 
from the pure financial aspects for shareholders to environmental, social and community issues. Moreover, Different 
kinds of firms may have different activities towards CSRD. In this paper, CSRD is embedded in annual reports which 
are obtained from A-share firms listed on SSE. An information item is considered as CSRD if it is related to one or 
more of the following stakeholders: shareholders, employees, consumers and products, environment, community and 
other interests (i.e., government or suppliers responsibility). In total 20 specific items are covered in this study. The 
responsibility item list is based on the set of Guideline of Corporate Social Responsibility for Listed Firms issued by 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and some international standards such as ISO 26000 and GRI 3.1.
8 
 In addition,  
 
                                                        
5 China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR), which is a professional database about Chinese stock market 
provided by GTA Co. in Shenzhen, http://www.gtadata.com/about/about.aspx. 
6 Both 2008 and 2009 refer to the firm’s fiscal year. CSRC regulation on CSR information disclosure took effect in 2009, when 
firms publish their annual reports of the fiscal year 2008. 
7 Industry classification is based on the ‘Industry Classification Guideline of Listed Firms’ issued by CSRC in 2001, the industry 
classification of each company are extracted from CSMAR data. 
8 In May 2008, Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) issued How to Strengthen CSR in Listed Firms and Guideline of Environment 
Information Disclosure of Listed Firms in SSE, and there is no guideline related to CSR on SSE. 
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CSRD in this paper is classified into 6 categories relating to different stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, 
customer services, environment, community and others. Table 2 summarizes the CSR items of Chinese listed firms. 
 
Table 2:  Number of Chinese Listed Firms Reporting CSR Information 
CSR Items 
2008 2009 
Change % 
N (%) N (%) 
Shareholder Responsibility    
Corporate Governance 848 (99.65) 856 (100.00) 0.35 
Obligation to Disclose 656 (77.09) 703 (82.13) 5.04 
Bonus Information 194 (22.80) 172 (20.09) -2.70 
Employee Responsibility    
Fair Employment 165 (19.39) 196 (22.90) 3.51 
Health & Safety 226 (26.56) 212 (24.77) -1.79 
Training and Education 244 (28.67) 240 (28.04) -0.63 
Professional Development 109 (12.81) 110 (12.85) 0.04 
Employee’s Welfare 193 (22.68) 238 (27.80) 5.12 
Consumers and Products    
Product Quality & Safety 199 (23.38) 199 (23.25) -0.14 
Customer Services 166 (19.51) 171 (19.98) 0.47 
Consumer Rights 85 (9.99) 60 (7.01) -2.98 
Environment/Energy Responsibility    
Pollution Control 168 (19.74) 141 (16.47) -3.27 
Environmental Conservation  144 (16.29) 75 (8.76) -8.16 
Conserving Natural Resources 72 (8.46) 53 (6.19) -2.27 
Energy Saving/Emission Reduction 303 (35.61) 319 (37.27) 1.66 
Community Responsibility    
Philanthropic Giving 247 (29.02) 210 (24.53) -4.49 
Public Welfare Undertaking 241 (28.32) 248 (28.97) 0.65 
Community Involvement 119 (13.98) 82 (9.58) -4.40 
Other Responsibility    
Government Responsibility 110 (12.93) 138 (16.12) 3.20 
Suppliers’ Responsibility 174 (20.45) 185 (21.61) 1.17 
Total of Disclosure Items 4665 4608  
Notes:  Numbers in brackets refer to proportion of the number of firms disclosing a certain item to the total number of firms (851 
for 2008, 856 for 2009). 
 
According to Table 2, there are 4665 pieces of CSR information disclosed in the annual reports of listed firms 
in 2008 and 4608 in 2009, respectively. The number of firms disclosing “employee welfare” item in employee 
responsibility section increases the highest, with a positive increase of 5.12%, while the number of firms disclosing the 
item “environmental conservation” in the environment/ energy responsibility section decreases the most, with a 
negative percentage of 8.16. With regard to the absolute value, we note that here were 144 pieces of information in 
2008 and only 75 in 2009, respectively. And hence, CSR disclosure in 2009 is less than that in 2008 generally. 
 
3.2.2 Independent Variables 
 
A binary codification is used to measure the environmental sensitivity proxy. High-profile environmental 
sensitive industries are considered to be those with more risk of being criticized in CSR matters because of their 
operations that inherently harm the natural environment. Based on existing literature (Patten, 1991; Adams, Hill and 
Roberts, 1998), the following “more sensitive” sectors are identified: Forestry, Mining, Paper, Oil and gas generating, 
Chemicals, Steel and other metals, Electricity, gas and water supply. All other industries are considered low-profile 
environment sensitive industries. A dummy variable, ENVI, is used to represent the environmental sensitivity: taking 
the value of 1 if a company is from a high-profile environmental industry and 0 otherwise. 
 
Depending on the closeness to consumer and community,
9
 firms are classified as two types: High-Profile 
firms with products close to community and final consumers and Low-Profile firms with products not so close to 
                                                        
9 Consumer and community proximity is simplified as consumer proximity for reading convenience in the following parts of this 
study. 
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community and consumers. According to Branco and Rodrigues (2008), the following industries are assumed to have 
high consumer proximity: Food manufacturing, Textiles, Household goods, Telecommunication Services, Food and 
Drug retailers, and Finance. A dummy variable, CONS, takes the value of 1 if a company belongs to a High-Profile 
consumer proximity industry and 0 otherwise. 
 
Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Media exposure (MED) is measured by 
the number of newspapers where firms publish their annual reports. MED takes the value of 2 if annual reports are 
published in all the three officially designated newspapers and at least one other newspaper. It takes the value of 1 if 
annual reports are published in all the three designated newspapers but not in any other newspapers. It takes the value 
of 0 if annual reports are published only in one or two of the three designated newspapers. 
 
3.2.3 Control Variables 
 
We control for firm age (AGE), ownership concentration (CONC), institutional shareholding percentage 
(INS) and disclosure year (YEAR). Specifically, firm age is represented by the number of years from when firms are 
listed on the stock exchange to the reporting year. Ownership concentration is measured by the ratio of shares held by 
the largest shareholder as a proportion of the total number of shares listed on the stock exchange (for example, Ghazali 
2007). Institutional shareholding percentage is measured by the ratio of shares held by institutional investors as a 
proportion of all the shares listed on the stock market (Roberts 1992; Ullmann 1985). Year is a dummy variable that is 
used to control the possible effect of time on the level of CSRD. 
 
3.3 Model 
 
The key methodology of this paper is to develop a multivariate regression model to test our hypotheses and 
identify the key determinants of CRSD among Chinese listed firms in 2008 and 2009. 
 
Seven different specifications are constructed with same explanatory variables but different dependent 
variables. Dependent variables include total CSRD in the annual reports (CSRDT), shareholder responsibility 
(CSRDSH), employee responsibility (CSRDEM), consumer responsibility (CSRDCS), environmental responsibility 
(CSRDEN), community responsibility (CSDRCM), and other responsibility (CSRDOT). 
 
Equation (1) presents the common format of all different models on the right hand side. The only difference 
between various models is the dependent variable on the left hand side. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
Iit it it it it it
it it it
CSRD ENV CONS SIZE MED AGE
CONC INS YEAR
     
   
     
   
 (1) 
 
where for company i: CSRDit refers to the CSRD index in year t (i.e., CSRDT; CSRDSH; CSRDEM; CSRDCS; 
CSRDEN; CSRDCM and CSRDOT, respectively); ENVI, environmental sensitivity; CONS, consumer proximity; SIZE, 
company size; MED, media exposure; AGE, firm age; CONC, ownership concentration; INS, institutional 
shareholding; YEAR, time variable; ε, error term. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The content analysis approach is employed to measure CSR disclosure level. The procedure is as follows. 
First, check against the given responsibility item list. Second, a score is assigned depending on whether an item is 
disclosed and the extent to which it is disclosed. A score of 2 is assigned if an item is disclosed in great detail. A score 
of 1 is assigned if an item is disclosed qualitatively without detailed explanation. If no related information is disclosed, 
the score is 0. For example, if a company discloses a detailed plan on pollution, estimated expenditure, or main 
development related to environmental protection, a score of 2 will be given. Third, for each company, scores are then 
added up to quantify the level of CSRD for each of the aspects and for all the aspects as a whole. Finally, to avoid the 
potential effects of the number of items evaluated for different responsibility sections, an index is given by dividing all 
the above-mentioned scores assigned to that company by the maximum possible scores for each given firm. In order to 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2013 Volume 29, Number 6 
1840 Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 2013 The Clute Institute 
keep the analysis process of CSRD index consistent and valid, a Master student is responsible for the whole process, 
and another Master student checked and confirmed all work independently. One author extracted and checked some 
sample data. The whole process takes about six months. 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the index for each category of CSRD and the total CSRD index. 
The values of the three categories of CSRD (CSRDSH, CSRDEM and CSRDOT) increased slightly from 2008 to 
2009. The values of the other three categories (CSRDCS, CSRDEN and CSRDCM) declined over the same period. 
The mean of CSRDT was only 0.27 in 2008 and 2009. This implies that the level of CSRD by Chinese listed firms was 
quite low. 
 
Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics of CSRD Index in 2008 and 2009 
Variables 
2008 2009 
Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum 
CSRDSH 0.664 0.214 0.000 1.000 0.673 0.199 0.167 1.000 
CSRDEM 0.217 0.332 0.000 1.000 0.230 0.347 0.000 1.000 
CSRDCS 0.170 0.292 0.000 1.000 0.163 0.269 0.000 1.000 
CSRDEN 0.196 0.289 0.000 1.000 0.169 0.246 0.000 1.000 
CSRDCM 0.240 0.374 0.000 1.000 0.200 0.328 0.000 1.000 
CSRDOT 0.160 0.303 0.000 1.000 0.182 0.330 0.000 1.000 
CSRDT 0.270 0.262 0.050 0.950 0.265 0.250 0.025 0.900 
 
There are four items relating to environment responsibility: pollution control, environmental conservation, 
natural resource conservation, and energy-saving/emission reduction. As discussed in the previous section, firms are 
divided into two types: high-profile environmentally sensitive firms and low-profile environmentally sensitive firms. 
Figure 1 compares the levels of CSRD relating to the four environmental information items between the two types of 
firms. It reveals that high-profile environmentally sensitive firms tend to disclose more than the low-profile 
environmentally sensitive firms. For example, 46% of high-profile environmentally sensitive firms disclosed energy 
saving and emission reduction information in 2009, while this percentage is only 36% in the low-profile 
environmentally sensitive firm group. 
 
Figure 1:  Information Disclosure by High/Low Environmentally Sensitive Industries 
Notes: 1 = pollution control; 2 = environmental conservation; 3 = natural resource conservation and  
4 = energy-saving/emission reduction. High-Profile = High-Profile environmentally sensitive  
industries; Low-Profile = Low-Profile environmentally sensitive industries. 
 
Six responsibility items are employed to represent consumer and community responsibilities, namely 
production quality and safety, costumer services; consumer rights, philanthropic giving, public welfare undertaking, 
and community involvement. 
 
Figure 2 compares the different levels of information disclosure by these two types of firms for all the six 
items. Apart from the disclosure of information on product quality and safety, High-Profile firms tend to disclose more 
information of all the other items than Low-Profile firms. For most items, however, the level of information disclosed 
declined from 2008 to 2009. 
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Figure 2:  Information Disclosure by High/Low Consumer Proximity Industries 
Notes: 1 = Product quality/safety; 2 = customer services; 3 = consumer rights; 4 = philanthropic giving;  
5 = public welfare undertaking; 6 = community involvement. High-Profile = High-Profile consumer  
proximity; Low-Profile = Low-Profile consumer proximity. 
 
According to the requirement set by SSE and CSRC in 2008, three kinds of firms (i.e., firms from the finance 
industry, firms listed on foreign stock exchanges, and firms in the SSE corporate governance composite index group) 
are required to disclose their CSR reports along with their annual reports. Table 4 presents the results of CSR reports 
disclosed by listed firms. 
 
Table 4:  CSR Reports Disclosed by Listed Firms on SSE 
Firms 
2008 2009 
N % N % 
Finance/Insurance 19 95.0 14 60.9 
Listed on foreign exchanges  48 96.0 35 66.0 
SSE governance board 221 95.7 156 65.3 
Mandatory disclosure firms 247 95.7 169 63.8 
Total sample  282 33.1 283 33.1 
Notes:  N = number of firms publishing CSR reports. % = a proportion of the number of firms publishing CSR reports to the total 
number of firms within the corresponding category on SSE. 
 
The results in Table 4 indicate that 282 firms published their CSR reports in 2008 and 283 in 2009 
respectively, accounting for one third of sample firms in both years. For mandatory CSR disclosers, 96% of the firms 
publish their CSR reports in 2008, but this proportion declined to only 64% in 2009. In contrast, the number of firms 
which voluntarily disclose CSR reports rose significantly, from 35 in 2008 to 114 in 2009. 
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of listed firms which publish CSR reports voluntarily by industry. Three 
industries published their CSR reports in 2009 for the first time, including agriculture, forestry, fishery and hunting; 
construction; and social services. Manufacturing was the dominant industry disclosing CSR reports. The number of 
firms disclosing CSR information in the Information and Technology industry increased dramatically from only 1 in 
2008 to 10 in 2009. This may be due to the rising public pressure on firms of this industry to publish their CSR 
information because the industry has become ever more important in the Chinese economy. 
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Figure 3:  Firms Voluntarily Published CSR Reports by Industry 
Notes: 1 = agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting; 2 = mining; 3 = manufacturing; 4 = electricity, gas &  
water supply; 5 = construction; 6 = transport & storage; 7 = information & technology; 8 = wholesale  
& retails; 9 = real estate; 10 = social services; 11 = media & culture; 12 = conglomerate. 
 
4.2 Multivariate Regression Results 
 
Before regression analysis, a series of diagnostic tests, such as multicollinearity test, have been carried out to 
ensure the validity and reliability of regression results. Multicollinearity is tested based on the correlation matrix 
incorporating all the independent variables as well as computing the variance inflation factor (VIF). Table 5 reports the 
correlation matrix which indicates that the highest correlation coefficient is 0.32. The highest value of VIF is far less 
than 2.
10
 All results suggest that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem. 
 
Table 5:  Correlation Coefficients between Explanatory Variables 
Variables ENVI CONS SIZE MED AGE CONC INS YEAR 
ENVI 1.000        
CONS 
-0.120*** 
(0.000) 
1.000       
SIZE 
0.135*** 
(0.000) 
0.080*** 
(0.001) 
1.000      
MED 
-0.004 
(0.857) 
0.030 
(0.213) 
0.257*** 
(0.000) 
1.000     
AGE 
-0.148 
(0.000) 
0.028 
(0.247) 
-0.264 *** 
(0.000) 
-0.189*** 
(0.000) 
1.000    
CONC 
0.163*** 
(0.000) 
-0.153*** 
(0.000) 
0.320*** 
(0.000) 
0.009 
(0.695) 
-0.170*** 
(0.000) 
1.000   
INS 
-0.019 
(0.435) 
-0.071 ** 
(0.003) 
0.207*** 
(0.000) 
0.084*** 
(0.001) 
-0.073*** 
(0.003) 
-0.034 
(0.162) 
1.000  
YEAR 
0.023 
(0.353) 
0.009 
(0.722) 
0.046* 
(0.057) 
0.028 
(0.255) 
0.110*** 
(0.000) 
-0.007 
(0.778) 
-0.017 
(0.480) 
1.000 
Notes:  (1) ENVI = environmentally sensitivity, CONS = consumer proximity, SIZE = firm size, MED = media exposure, AGE = 
firm age, CONC = ownership concentration, INS = institutional shareholding, YEAR = time dummy. (2) *, **, *** Significant at 
10%, 5%, 1% respectively (2-tailed). 
 
Table 6 reports the multivariate regression results. Three interesting results are evident. First, firm size is 
positively associated with the level of CSRD in all regressions, supporting the hypothesis H2. Second, the extent of 
media exposure is positively related with the level of CSRD, supporting the hypothesis H3. Third, we find 
environment sensitive industries and consumer proximity industries respond to the stringent regulation and public 
visibility differently.
                                                        
10 VIF results are not included in this table due to space limitations (results available upon request) 
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Table 6:  Regression Results of Models using Different CSRD Indicators as Dependent Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Intercept ENVI CONS SIZE MED AGE CONC INS YEAR Adj. R2 D-W 
CSRDSH 
0.255*** 
(0.001) 
-0.015 
(0.541) 
-0.392 
(0.695) 
0.155*** 
(0.000) 
0.043* 
(0.078) 
-0.104*** 
(0.000) 
0.042* 
(0.097) 
0.095*** 
(0.000) 
0.027 
(0.251) 
0.070 1.887 
CSRDEM 
-1.331*** 
(0.000) 
-0.050** 
(0.024) 
-0.009 
(0.695) 
0.348*** 
(0.000) 
0.054** 
(0.018) 
-0.113*** 
(0.000) 
0.061** 
(0.011) 
0.082*** 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.439) 
0.201 1.928 
CSRDCS 
-0.961*** 
(0.000) 
-0.057** 
(0.013) 
-0.018 
(0.422) 
0.304 *** 
(0.000) 
0.059** 
(0.012) 
-0.073*** 
(0.002) 
0.031 
(0.209) 
0.126*** 
(0.000) 
-0.019 
(0.385) 
0.158 1.838 
CSRDEN 
-1.107*** 
(0.000) 
0.064*** 
(0.004) 
-0.010 
(0.654) 
0.355*** 
(0.000) 
0.058*** 
(0.009) 
-0.081*** 
(0.000) 
0.071*** 
(0.002) 
0.094*** 
(0.000) 
-0.058*** 
(0.007) 
0.223 1.883 
CSRDCM 
-1.649*** 
(0.000) 
-0.044** 
(0.043) 
0.014 
(0.532) 
0.403 *** 
(0.000) 
0.060*** 
(0.007) 
-0.081*** 
(0.000) 
0.030 
(0.188) 
0.089*** 
(0.000) 
-0.056*** 
(0.009) 
0.235 1.872 
CSRDOT 
0.939*** 
(0.000) 
-0.023 
(0.321) 
-0.008 
(0.734) 
0.252*** 
(0.000) 
0.039 
(0.104) 
-0.047* 
(0.056) 
0.063** 
(0.012) 
0.098*** 
(0.000) 
0.029 
(0.206) 
0.110 1.983 
CSRDT 
-1.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.026 
(0.229) 
-0.007 
(0.738) 
0.373*** 
(0.000) 
0.062*** 
(0.005) 
-0.102*** 
(0.000) 
0.059** 
(0.011) 
0.110*** 
(0.000) 
-0.014 
(0.502) 
0.232 1.888 
Notes:  (1) Dependent variables. The first 4 letters of different dependent variables CSRD = corporate social responsibility disclosure. CSRDT is a total score index. The last 2 
letters of other variables represent different aspects of information disclosure: SH = shareholders, EM = employees, CS = consumer services, EN = environment, CM = community, 
OT = other social responsibilities. (2) Explanatory variables. ENVI = environmentally sensitive industry, CONS = consumer sensitive industry, SIZE = firm size, MED = media 
exposure, AGE = firm age, CONC = ownership concentration, INS = ownership by institutional investors, YEAR = time dummy. (3) D-W = Durbin-Watson statistics. Figures in 
parentheses represent the p-values. (4) *, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively (2-tailed). 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2013 Volume 29, Number 6 
1844 Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 2013 The Clute Institute 
Specifically, environmental sensitive industry, represented by ENVI, is significantly and positively related to 
the level of CSRD relating to the disclosure of environmental information (CSRDEN), but negatively related to the 
information disclosure level on employees (CSRDEM) and community (CSRDCM) issues. It has little effect on other 
CSR information items. Hypothesis 1a is partly supported. However, Consumer sensitivity industry, represented by 
CONS, is found to have insignificant effect on the CSRD level in all aspects. The results, therefore, reject the 
hypothesis 1b. 
 
In light of the control variables, ownership concentration is positively related to the CSRD in most model 
specifications. The institutional shareholding is positively related to CSRD in all models consistently. The higher 
ownership concentration and institutional shareholding percentage is, the higher CSR information disclosure level. 
YEAR represents the trend that CSR disclosure changes over the sample years. Results indicate that CSR information 
disclosed in 2009 is less than that in 2008 in general, particularly for CSR information related to environment 
(CSRDEN) and consumer (CSRDCM), which are significant at the level of 5%. 
 
Firm age is negatively correlated with the level of CSRD, in contrast to existing studies but it is not surprising 
in the context of China. Roberts (1992) suggests that firm age is significantly related to environmental disclosure and 
finds a positive relationship between them. There are several other arguments offering plausible explanations why 
younger firms are less likely to report social information than older ones. For instance, younger firms are generally 
smaller and have fewer issues to report than older ones. Considering the possible detriment to their competitiveness, 
younger firms may be more reluctant to disclose information as they may be price-sensitive (Parsa and Kouhy 2008). 
 
However, younger firms provide a different picture in this study, because firm age in this study refers to the 
time span between when a firm was listed on SSE and the sample year. As a matter of fact, a lot of newly listed Chinese 
firms may have existed for a long time before they were listed on SSE. There are three main sources. One source is that 
some large state-owned enterprises formally listed on the Hong Kong Exchange first, such as Bank of China and Petro 
China, and then returned to be listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The second source is that some gigantic 
state-owned enterprises only made their initial public offerings (IPOs) in recent years, including the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Life, China Construction Bank and China Mobile. These firms may have 
existed for a long time but they are considered to be young in terms of their short history in the stock market. The third 
source is that many Chinese firms have been merged or reorganized in recent years. For example, Handan Steel Co., 
Chengde Fantai Co. and Tang Steel Co. have been merged to form the new Hebei Steel Group. 
 
The common feature of these firms is that they are considered to be new in the stock market although they 
have a long operation and public visibility history. They are actually well established in the market and are not afraid 
of disclosing social information for losing their competitiveness (Qwusu-Ansah, 1998). More importantly, a number 
of these “newly” listed firms are large state-owned enterprises which are more likely to publish CSR reports than their 
private counterparts. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Corporate social information in annual reports represents one of the most important mechanisms that firms 
can use to influence public policy without being widely scrutinized by ordinary people who do not have easy access to 
these reports. By analysing the annual reports in 2008 and/or in 2009 published by A-share listed firms on SSE, this 
paper investigates the determinants of CSR disclosure in emerging China. Our main findings are as follows. First, CSR 
disclosure has become common practice among Chinese listed firms, but is still very low. Second, firm size, 
ownership concentration, institutional shareholding and media exposure are positively and significantly associated 
with the levels of various CSRD indicators. In other words, larger firms, firms with one single controlling owner or 
institution, and firms willing to share their CSR practice with the public tend to disclose more CSR information. Third, 
with regard to the industry-specific variables, we find that firms in environmental sensitivity industries disclose more 
CSR information related the environment improvement, while firms in consumer sensitivity industries do not provide 
more CSR information related to consumer and community. 
 
Our results provide important policy implications. Firstly, government is the main driver of the development 
of CSR disclosure. Chinese listed firms are more willing to disclose their CSR information if the government imposes 
stronger rules and regulations. Over 95% of firms requested to report CSR information by SSE complied with the 
regulations. Among those firms reporting CSR information in annual report, only one-third of them voluntarily 
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disclose such information without official requirement over the sample period. Hence, facing increasingly serious 
environment pollution and social conflicts, it is necessary for government to regulate CSR activities and information 
disclosure to develop a more harmonious society. 
 
Secondly, although both political cost theory and legitimacy theory are important perspectives to understand 
CSR disclosure practice, political cost appears to be the main constraint for Chinese firms to determine whether to 
disclose CSR Reports and what to be disclosed in annual reports. The number of firms disclosing CSR reports 
decreased significantly in 2009. An explanation for this is the absence of detailed mandatory guideline and 
punishment mechanism for non-compliance. Indeed, two industry-specific proxies also provide evidence on this. For 
example, firms in high-profile environmentally sensitive industries provide more CSR information related to the 
environment responsibility, while firms in high-profile consumer proximity industries do not provide more CSR 
information as expected, the main reason is that environmental regulation and policies are becoming more stringent 
than others. There are important implications for academics and government regulators. For academics, political cost 
theory is suitable to understand CSRD in Chinese context. For government regulators, a detailed mandatory guideline 
on CSR information disclosure is necessary for the effectiveness of mandatory CSR disclosure requirement. 
 
Thirdly, small businesses exploit the annual reports as a strategy to legitimize their corporate social conduct, 
and ultimately legitimize themselves in the market. In China, it is difficult for small firms to raise finance, which 
becomes more serious when banks tighten the criteria for granting loans. Then managers of small firms can increase 
media exposure to build up their corporate image and legitimize their corporate social conduct. Managers of small 
firms can employ annual reports as an exposure strategy to legitimize their corporate social conduct. 
 
However, our results should be interpreted with certain caveats. First, an unavoidable limitation for the 
content analysis is rooted. During the process of indexing for each CSR item, it was weighted equally without 
considering that different items might have different impact on users’ decision making. Although this is a little 
subjective, it is a generally accepted method in most CSR literature (e.g., Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). Second, we do 
not include the owner identity in variables. As a matter of fact, government controlled firms account for the majority of 
Chinese listed firms. Whether there is different response to the government regulation between government controlled 
firms and private firms is unclear. It might have interactive effects on our test for political cost and legitimacy theory, 
and hence we do not include it in this paper and would make it for our future research. 
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